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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLAIR SORENSON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
Case No. 15916 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH and JEFFERY LYNN 
NELSON, 
Respondents, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent, Nelson sought benefits under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act for injuries he suffered in the course of his 
employment while painting one of Appellant's apartments. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The evidence was heard by Kenneth Rigtrup, Administrative 
Law Judge, on March 15, 1976. Pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-77 the 
medical aspects of the case were referred to a medical panel. 
Before the Medical Panel Report had been completed Judge Rigtrup 
left the Commission and was replaced by Administrative Law Judge 
Joseph C. Foley. On April 14, 1978 after reviewing Judge Rigtrup's 
notes, the transcripts and the medical panel report, Judge Foley 
awarded compensation to the Respondent pursuant to the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. On April 26, 1978 Appellant filed a Motion for 
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Review. Upon receiving the Motion for Review, Judge Foley, in 
accordance with U.C.A. 35-1-82.53, referred the entire case~ 
the Industrial Commission. The Commission pursuant to U.C.A. 
35-1-82. 54 reviewed the entire record including the file containi:r 
Judge Rigtrup's notes, the transcript of the record and the 
medical pane". report. On June 19, 1978 the Commission adopted 
Judge Foley's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in 
their entirety and denied the Appellant's Motion for Review. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks to affirm the Findings and Orde~ 
of the Industrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The general framework of Appellant's statement of fact 
is correct as far as it goes, but there are many important ommissil 
I 
particularly ommissions regarding the employment relationship 
between Appellant and Respondent 
disability. For this reason the 
and the nature of Respondent's I 
facts conce:cning these events art I 
restated so that one complete picture may be presented. Numbers [ 
in parenthesis refer to pages of record. 
At all times pertinent to this case Appellant owned ninE· 
rental units in Salt Lake City located as follows: 
Duplex 
1126 - 1129 Princeton Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Duplex 
548 East 7th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
-2-
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Fourplex 
1144 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Duplex 
1019 - 1921 East Lake Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
House 
1032 Downington Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Fourplex 
2303 Green 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
House 
367 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
House 
819 West 1400 North 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
House 
656 Hollywood Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
House 
550 East 7th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah (126,159,160,161) 
During 1975 Appellant collected $28,794.00 from this 
network of rental properties and spent $22,683.00 maintaining 
and remodeling them. (161) 
Appellant and Respondent met in February, 1975 when they 
were taking a class together at the University of Utah. Appellant 
discovered that Respondent could do carpenter work and offered him 
$4.00 an hour to repair, remodel and paint apartments. (28, 30, 36, 
37, 70, 149) Between February and August of 1975 Respondent worked 
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for and with Appellant at several rental uni ts. ( 29, 37, 38 
1
43_ 48 , 
114, 115, 141) Appellant specifically designated the date, the 
place and how the work was to be performed. He also suggested hoi: 
long the work should take. (34, 48, 96) 
During the middle of August, 197 5, Appellant and his 
wife, Mrs. Sorenson, assured Respondent that they had plenty of 
work for him on the rental units. Mrs. Sorenson also told 
Respondent he could expect about 40 hours work per month for an 
indefinite period of time and that they could afford to pay him 
about $160.00 per month. (31, 82, 92, 148, 154) 
From the end of July, 197 5 until August 29, 1975 the 
date of the accident, Appellant gave Respondent a series of 
specifi::: instructions concerning the painting of the North and 
West sides of the fourplex located at 1144 East 5th South. ( 50' 51, 
89,149) Respondent was told that he must use a wire brush and I 
I 
scraper, both of which Appellant was to provide, to scrape and br 0~ 
the woodwork and cinderblock surfaces of the walls. (50,51,89, 
90, 149) After he had done that he was to apply a coat of primer 
and then a final coat of paint using the ladders, brushes and pai:l 
to be supplied by the Appellant. (51,52,89) 
work Respondent had performed for Appellant, 
to be $4.00 per hour. (28,30,36,37,70,149) 
As was true in prevll1 
Respondent's wage wa: 
Pursuant to Appellant's instructions, On August 27th, 
days before the accident, Respondent worked six or seven hours 
scraping and brushing the North and West sides of the 1144 Eas' 
5th South duplex. (49, 52) Thereafter, Appellant inspected the 
-4-
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the work that had been done and not being pleased with the results, 
instructed Respondent by telephone to do the job over. (52,53,54) 
In redoing the work he was to use a brush, soap and water. (52,53, 
54,151) 
On the 28th of August, the day before the accident, 
because Appellant had not provided the equipment he had promised, 
Respondent could not work. (53) 
On the morning of the 29th of August Respondent received 
a telephone call from Appellant, who told him that his wife would 
give him the soap, bucket and the brushes if he would come over to 
his house. (53, 147, 151) During the telephone conversation Appellant 
repeate~ his instructions on how to prepare the cinderblock and 
woodwork by scrubbing with soap and water. (53, 54, 147, 151) 
Respondent was again told to prime the workwork with primer which 
Appellant had purchased and had stored away for use on this apartment. 
(53,54,147,151) In accordance with Appellant's instructions 
Respondent went to Appellant's home, got the bucket, the soap and 
the scrub brushes and returned to th2 apartments at 1144 East 5th 
South. Following Appellant's instructions he mixed the soap 
solution, climbed the ladder and started scrubbing the cinderblock. 
During the performance of the work Respondent fell and sustained 
the injuries herein complained of. (54-58) 
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POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S 
FINDINGS THAT APPELLl\_NT WAS AN El·1PLOYER WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF THE h'ORKJV1..EN' S COMPEllSATION ACT. 
The Appellant devoted a substantial amount of time 
managing his apartrr.ents. In order to conduct this business it 
was necessary for him to keep substantial records regarding his 
income, expenditures, labor performed, hours worked, and allocoU 
I 
of expenses to the rental units concerned. (126,161,166-168) I 
He had a substantial amount invested in hand and power tools and 
equipment. (38,47,51,78) He worked on the apartments himself, 
hired and supervised other persons and procured the services of 
independent contractors as needed. (46,48,53,166) 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined the term "Employer" 
within the meaning of Sec. 35-1-42 to be a term which is "broad 
enough to cover all employment relationships". Ortega vs. Salt uj 
Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P. 2d 885 (1945). This I 
definition is in accordance with the basic purpose of the Act: I 
"Construction of statutory definitions. The definition [ 
of "employer" contained in the compensation acts, or .I 
statements as to who shall be deemed employers, should 
be broadly or liberally construed, in order to eff~ctua: 
the purpose of the legislation to afford compensatwn~I 
an employee and his dependents, the intention of the I 
legislature being gathered from a consideration of the 
whole act. The basic purpose of the act is the inclu5101i 
of employers, not their exclusion, and doubts of Juns;,JJ 
diction must be resolved in favor of inclusion rather;· 1 
exclusion, . . 99 C.J.S. \·lorkmen's Compens0t1on 58' 
-6-
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Appellant's rental operations were so extensive that 
it must be concluded that he was an employer within the meaning 
of the act. 
Appellant relies on SommerJille vs. Industrial commission, 
113 Utah 504, 196 P. 2d 718 (1948) in support of his contention 
that his extensive rental operations are not a business and hence 
that he is not an employer within the meaning of the statute. The 
decision in Sommerville, however, is an exception to the general 
rule stated in the Ortega case and is to be confined narrowly to the 
facts of Sommerville. The narrow application of the holding in that 
case is indicated by the language of the Utah Supreme Court on Page 
721 of the opinion. The Court said: 
"Our holding is limited to the facts of this case, i.e. 
th2-: wi1ere a person owns one piece of real estate which 
he "rents out" to tenants-;-but does not either personally 
or by agent devote a substantial time to the oepration 
or management of such property, the owning and renting 
of such property does not constitute a business within 
the meaning of the workmen's compensation act." (Emphasis 
added) 196 P. 2d at 721 
There is a substantial difference between the facts now 
before the court and the facts in the Sommerville case. For this 
reason Sommerville should not be controlling on the issues now 
before the court. 
In Sommerville, a woman who owned a coffee shop also owned 
one other building which she rented out to a grocer. There was no 
evidence to show that she spent any more time in renting the building 
-7-
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than it took to receive ond c.:i.sli one c!iecl; per month. She hired 
the plaintiff to perform some minor:- repairs on the rented build. 
l., 
and after showing him where the building was, did not visit the 
work site again until after the work was completed. She did no~ 
supervise the plaintiff in any way, nor did she furnish him with 
any tools. Thus, her time commitment was substantially less 
than that of the Appellant in this case. 
The facts in this case are very similar to the facts in 
Davis vs. Industrial Commission, 297 Ill. 39, 130 N.E. 333 (19211 
In Davis the defendant was a hardware and paint merchant but aloe I 
owned a separate piece of rental property with 15 rental units. 
The two plaintiffs were employed by the defendant to clean the 
I 
I 
outside walls of the building in which the rental units were 
located. 'I'hc:y were injured when the scaffold upon which they Wert• 
I 
standing gave way. The plaintiff's were awarded compensation by~ 
arbitrator. The Industrial Commission and the Circuit Court 
affirmed the award of the arbitrator. Upon appeal the defendant 
I 
I 
claimed that he did not come within the provisions of the \'/orJ;rner.'1 
Compensation Act because he was engaged in the hardware and pain: I 
business rather than in the business of maintaining the rental 
units. The Illinois Supreme Court held inter alia that defendant'1 
activities in maintaining the rental property also constituted a I 
business within the meaning of the \vorkmen' s Compensation statuti I 
and affirmed the compensation award. 
-8-
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1 
I 
I 
I 
Appellant also asserts that because he claimed a loss 
on the .:ipartmcnts that he was not in business. This loss is 
theoretical because current real estate values are appreciating 
at a phenomenal rate rather than depreciating. Although for tax 
purposes Appellant claimed a loss of $4,273.00, in reality he 
made a tax free profit of $6,411.00, the difference between his 
gross income of $28,794.00 and his business expense of $22,383.00. 
( 161) Because of this claimed tax loss, Appellant also saved tax 
on a substantial portion of his government employee's income. (158) 
Appellant reaped a substantial benefit from his apartment and home 
rental business. 
The ownership and management of Appellant's apartments 
and houses constituted a business within the meaning of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act regardless of net profit or lack of profit. 
In Larsen, Workmen's Compensation Law, (1973) Vol. lA, Section 50.44 
(a) the rule is stated as follows: 
On one point a fair degree of unanimity seems to have 
emerged in the absence of a "pecuinary-gain" requirement 
(Utah's Workmen's Compensation Statute has none) the 
concept of trade or business does not necessarily embrac~ 
the element of profit seeking ... the test is not 
whether the employer is in business for profit, but 
whether he is in business at all. If he supplies a 
product or service it is immaterial what he does w~th 
his profit, or whether he expects or gets any profit 
at all. (Emphasis added) 
-9-
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follows: 
POINT II. 
THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT 
RESPONDENT WAS AN EMPLOYEE AND NOT AN H1DEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR WITHIN THE MEANING OF U.C.A. 35-1-43. 
A leading Utah case has enunciated the rule as 
"When the employer retains supervision and control 
of the work to be performed, the workmen are 
employees." Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Commission, 
Utah , 562 P. 2d 227, 228 (1977) 
There was substantial evidence showing that Appellan'. 
retained control of every detail of the work to be performed bj 
the Respondent. The clearest example of this is the way the 
Appellant supervised Respondent's painting of the 1144 East 5th 
South fourplex, the place where the Respondent was injured. 
Appellant told Respondent which sides to paint, where to begin, 
how to begin and what tools to use. ( 50, 90) He furnished the 
Respondent with all of the hand tools, brushes, buckets, a laddo:I 
and paint. ( 52, 89) He inspected the work. ( 52) He was not 
satisfied with the result after Respondent had scraped the walls 
with a scraper and wire brush 
surface with soap and water. 
and therefore directed him to w:o:i 
At one point Respondent could not I 
work because the Appellant did not ha'.'e the equipment ready. 
Respondent worked for a wage of $4.00 per hour. 
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The following two cases are examples of how this court 
has applied the law when the facts were virtually identical to 
the facts in this case. 
In Rustler Lodge vs. Industrial Commission, Utah 
562 P. 2d 227 (1977), Plaintiff, a skilled drywall applicator, 
was hired by the defendant, Rustler Lodge, to drywall a storage 
area and the ceiling of a conference room in the lodge. The lodge 
was engaged in the lodging and restaurant business. Plaintiff and 
defendant came to an agreement under the terms of which plaintiff 
was to furnish his own materials and his own special tools. 
Defendant was to furnish a protective drop cloth and a ladder 
and was to pay plaintiff at an hourly rate of $8.00 per hour. 
Plaintiff fell on a stairway while performing his services at the 
lodge and suffered injuries necessitating surgery. The Industrial 
Corrunission ruled that plaintiff was an employee of the defendant 
rather than an independent contractor. This Court affirmed,holding 
that the following factors were substantial evidence of control: 
(1) The laborer was taken over the entire job and 
shown what service to perform. 
-11-
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(2) The employer furnished him a ladder and pr6tectivE 
covering. 
( 3) The laborer was not allowed to commence work on 
his first appearance. 
(4) He was paid an hourly wage. Ibid. at p. 229 
It is also important to note in the Rustler case that 
this Court upheld the Commission's findings even though there 
were several facts, not present in this case, which militate a~air'' 
the finding of control. They are: 
(1) I The laborer was to work only once for the employer. : 
He was merely to drywall a storage area and the 
ceiling of a conference room. 
(2) He supplied all of the materials. 
(3) He supplied all of his own special tools to perforr 
the work except for a ladder and a protective 
covering. Ibid. 
In Capitol Cleaners and Dyers vs. Industrial Commission, 
85 Utah 295, 39 P. 2d 681, (1935) a painter was hired by a clean1q 
I 
and dying establishment for the one-time task of painting a smoke· I 
stack. The day after the painter began work he fell and was killi 
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Industrial commissioi 
awarding compensation to the dependents of the painter. It held 
that the painter was an employee and not an independent contracto: 
because: 
(1) No estimate of cost or the time submitted to the 
cleaning company nor was any called for by t~t 
company. 
-12-
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(2) All of the laborer's equipment and supplies were 
furnished by the company. 
(3) The laborer, a painter, was paid an hourly rate. 
(4) In all respects except the actual mechanics of 
painting the work was to be done under the 
supervision and subject to the direction of the 
employer. 
Appellant relies on Sommerville vs. Industrial Commission, 
113 Utah 504, 196 P. 2d 718 (1948) in support of his argument that 
the Respondent in this case was an independent contractor. 
Sommerville is easily distinguished on the facts. In Sommerville 
the Appellant merely showed the Respondent what work she wanted 
done and left the manner and method of accomplishing the work up 
to the Respondent. After Appellant showed Respondent what she 
wanted done, she went back to the coffee shop. She never visited 
the site again until the work was completed. Ibid. at P. 750. 
The facts are vastly different than in this case where 
the Appellant worked alongside Respondent, furnished all the tools 
and materials, and inspected the work and even made him redo 
certain tasks. 
Appellant also contends that because Respondent received 
credit on the rent that he owed Appellant at a rate of $4.00 an 
hour that this was not consideration within the meaning of the 
Workmen's compensation Act. In support of this argument Appellant 
citGs Oberhansly vs. Travelers Insurance Company, 5 Utah 2d 15, 
294 P. 2d 1093 (1956). The holding in the Oberhansly case is not 
-13-
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applicable to this case because in Oberhansly "there was no 
agreement to pay wages or salary." Ibid. at P. 1095. The Utah 
Supreme Court in the Oberhansly decision clarified the purpose 
of requiring consideration. It said: 
"The purpose of the act is to provide compensation 
for earning power, lost in industry, and the only 
basis for computing compensation is the earning 
ability of the employee in the particular employment 
out of which the loss arises. In short, the term 
"employee" indicates a person hired to work for wages 
as the employer may direct." (Emphasis added) Ibid. 
In contrast, in this case there was a definite agreeme:: 
between Appellant and Respondent for the payment of a wage or 
salary which was $4. 00 per hour. The Commission used this agree. 
upon rate to compute the basis of the Respondent's earning abilr 
The fact that Respondent was to be given credit for his hourly 
earnings toward his rent does not change the employer-employee 
relationship. This specific designation fulfills the requiremer 
called for in the Oberhansly case. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "wages" as: 
"Compensation given to a hired person for his or her 
services ... Every form of remuneration payable for 
a given period to an individual for personal services 
including salaries . . rent, housing, lodging · · · . 
any other similar advantage received from the individua. 
employer or directly with resr:iect to work for him." ~ 
Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. Rev., p. 1750. 
Thus, the compensation received by Respondent was 
consideration within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. 
-14-
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POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT RESPONDENT'S BMPLOY~1E~'T WAS NOT 
CJl.SlJAL WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACT. . ,, 
Appellant claims that Respondent's employment was casual 
within the meaning of U.C.A. 35-1-43. This court defined the 
meaning of "casual" in Utah Copper Company vs. Industrial 
Commission, 57 Utah 118, 193 P. 24 (1920). In that case a 
farmer was hired by the copper company at different times 
during the winter to repair an irrigation ditch that was used 
by the copper company for mining and milling purposes. After 
just three days of work the farmer received injuries which 
resulted in his death. The following language of the Supreme 
Court further describes the conditions of the farmer's employment. 
" . . . there was no regularity of employment 
At the time of the employment of the deceased nothing 
was said as to the length of time that such employment 
would continue. It was understood that as soon as 
the necessary repairs were made upon the canal such 
employment would cease." Ibid at p. 29. 
Despite the irregularity and uncertain duration of the 
farmer's employment with the copper company the Commission granted 
an award to his dependents. The District Court affirmed. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court holding that employment 
was not casual if it was necessary to the furtherance of the 
employer's business. Since the copper company needed the water in 
the ditch for milling and mining purposes, the repairs to the ditch 
performed by the farmer were necessary to the enhancement or 
furtherance of the copper company's business. Thus, his employment 
was not casual within the meaning of the Utah Workmen's Compensation 
Act. 
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Respondent's efforts in repairing and pai:-i ting enhancE; 
Appellant's apartment rental business. Respondent's work incre, 
the rental value of the apartments, made them more attractive, 
easier to rent, and increased their rental life. In his treati; 
on Workmen's Compensation Larsen deals with the issue of the 
repairman as follows: 
"Behind all these decisions lies one simple thought: 
Maintenance, repairs, painting, cleaning, and the like 
are in the course of business because the business · 
could not be carried on without them, and because they 
are an expectible, routine and inherent part of carrvi:. 
on any enterprise." Larsen, Workmen's Compensation,- (i 
Sec. 51. 23 
This Court in Capitol Cleaners and Dyers vs. Industria: 
Commission, 39 P. 2d 681 (1935), Supra, adopted the same rationi 
In that case the Court held that the employment of a painter to 
paint a smokestack, al though the job was of a one-time nature, 
nevertheless was not casual, because it was necessary to the 
accomplishment of the company's purposes and promoted its busini 
Ibid, at p. 681. 
The conclusions based upon the facts in the order whic' 
is the subject of this appeal are all within the requirements~ 
the Utah cases cited herein. The Industrial Commission should' 
affirmed if the fundamental purposes of the workmen's compens~ 
Act are to be given effect. 
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POINT IV. 
THE APPELLANT RECEIVED COMPLETE PROCEDURAL DUE 
PROCESS WHERE BEFORE RENDERING THEIR RESPECTIVE 
DECISIONS BOTH THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE, WHO 
ISSUED THE FINAL ORDER, AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE FILE, THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT, 
THE REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT MlD THE PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 
OF THE ADMIIlISTRATIVE LA\·l uUDGE WHO HEARD THE EVIDENCE. 
The testimony of the witnesses in this case was carefully 
considered by Administrative Law Judge, Kenneth Rigtrup. After 
Judge Rigtrup heard the testimony in this case he resigned his 
position with the Industrial Commission to accept an appointment 
on the Public Service Commission. Thereafter, Judge Foley assumed 
responsiblity for the case. The Medical Panel Report was not 
received until after Judge Rigtrup had left the Industrial 
Commission. ( 266). 
The record shows that upon taking over this case Judge 
Foley carefully examined the file, the transcript and the 
medical panel report. (309) The affidavit of Judge Foley, which 
supplements the record on appeal, makes it clear that the file 
contained Judge Rigtrup's mental impressions, preliminary findings 
and conclusions. 
At Appellant's request, by way of Motion for Review, the 
Industrial Commission made a further perusal of all of the 
evidence. The record shows that pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-82.53 and 
35-1-82.54 the members of the commission carefully examined the 
transcript, the medical panel report and the file which had been 
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prepared by Judge Rigtrup. ( 3 3 2) The Commission adopted Jue: 
Foley's Findings of Fact ctnd Conclusions of Law in their er.t;: 
The test to determine if rec1u ircments of due process 
have been met in an administrative proceeding is set forth~ 
16 A c.J.S. constitutional Law, Sec. G28, as follows: 
"Procedural due process in administrative law is 
generally recognized to be a matter of greater 
flexibility than when dealinci with strictly judicia'. 
tribunals . . The cardinal test of the presence 
or absence of due process of law in an administrati'lc 
proceeding is the presence or absence of rudiments 
of fair play long known to the law . 
The careful review by both the Administrative Law J~ 
and the Industrial Commission gave the Appellant due process' 
all the procedural safeguards required by law. 
Ille Appellant relies heavily on Crow vs. Industrial 
Commission, 104 Utah 333, 140 P. 2c1 321 (1943), to support hii 
contention that he was denied procedural safeyuards. In that 
case the circumstances were much different than those presenci 
before the court. 
In the Crow case the record failed to show that the 
preliminary finc1ings of the commissioner who hecird the evidenc 
were available to the full commission that m,>dc the Findings c 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. Ibid. at P. 322. In this CilSe, 
however, the record clearly shOl·.'s th«t both ,Juche Foley ,1nd t'.: 
Commission carefully reviewed thc ['rcli:nin,JCy ~inclin0s of Jue:· 
-18-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rigtrup, the transcript and the medical panel report. The review 
by the Commission of Judge Foley's findings and order pursuant 
to 35-1-85.53 and 35-82.54 was a procedure not available at the 
time the Crow case was decided. Therefore, that decision is not 
controlling of the issues in this case. 
POINT V. 
APPELLANT WAIVED HIS OBJECTION TO THE MEDICAL 
PANEL REPORT BY FAILING TO OBJECT WITHIN THE 
TIME PROVIDED BY LAW. 
u.c.A. Sec. 35-1-77 provides that an employer may object 
to the findings of a medical panel within 15 days after that report 
is mailed to him. The statute further provides that if objections 
are not filed within the 15 day period the report is admitted in 
evidence and the Commission may base its findings on the report 
of the panel. 
Appellant received the Medical Panel Report with written 
notice thereupon that he could object to the findings of the 
medical panel within fifteen days. Despite the written warning, 
Appellant made no objection to the findings of the medical panel. 
His objection is interposed for the first time upon appeal. 
By not objecting in the manner provided by law Appellant 
waived his objection to the Medical Panel Report. The report then 
became the evidence of the case in regard to the extent and 
, t • · · · e Utah Rules of Evidence, permanency of the Responaen s inJuri s. 
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Rule No. 4 provides that before a decision can be reversed or 
remanded because of the admission of certain evidence the 
Appellant must have interposed a timely and specifically state' 
objection. 
Appellant also appears to question the nature and ext: 
of Respondent's injuries. The impartial Medical Panel Report 
clearly details the seriousness and extent of these injuries. 
Panel found that Respondent suffered severe injuries to his r~ 
hip and right wrist as a result of the accident. His upper~ 
was broken into fragments which had to be fastened together by 
means of a metal compression screw. (267) His wrist was fractur 
in several places causing bone spurs to form and arthritis ~ 
set ir.. (267,268) As a result of those injuries, Respondentw: 
unable to work for a period of six months after his accident. 
In December, 1976, it was necessary to have the compression sc: 
surgically removed from Respondent's hip. ( 266) Shortly therec 
Respondent required surgery upon his wrist because of the extE 
pain caused by slight movement. (267) The last operation was c 
marginally successful and there remains a possibility of the nE 
for additional surgery involving the total wrist. As his tra~ 
arthritis worsens, cortisone and pain killers will be requir~. 
On the basis of the x-rays and a physical examination· 
Medical Panel concluded that Respondent's percentage of perma~: 
physical impairment was a 10~; loss of the upper extremeties or 
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6% loss of the whole man. None of these impairments were due 
to any prior injury. (268) 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the magnitude of Appellant's rental operations 
and the various jobs performed by Respondent on these properties, 
there is substantial evidence to support the Commissions findings 
that he was an employer within the meaning of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. Moreover, Appellant's close supervision of 
Respondent, particularly at the 1144 E. 5th South apartments 
constitute substantial evidence of control and establish the fact 
that Respondent was an employee within the meaning of the act. 
The Appellant received complete procedural due process 
where both the Administrative Law Judge, who issued the Findings 
and Order, and the Industrial Commission, carefully reviewed the 
transcript, the medical panel report and the preliminary findings 
of the Administrative Law Judge who heard the evidence. 
The medical evidence clearly establishes that Respondent 
suffered severe, permanent injuries in the course of his employment. 
Appellant waived any objection he had to the introduction of the 
medical evidence by failing to object to the Panel Report. 
-21-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
affirmed. 
The Order of the Industrial Corrunission should be 
Respectfully submitted, 
KUNZ, KUNZ & HADLEY 
~ u&;'~ BY: - '-t« ~ ~
R¢ellJ. Had0f 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Jeffrey Lynn Nelson 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies, pos~ 
prepaid, of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to counsel for 
Appellant, Ro~ald F. Sysak, Prince, Yates & Geldzahler, 455 S 
Third East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ~day of Sept 
1978. 
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